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FREEDOM: DOES CUTTER V. WILKINSON CHANGE THE
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I. OVERVIEW
Legal commentators and scholars consistently argue that a
compulsory mandate to attend Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.), either
as a condition of probation or as an inmate, violates the First
Amendment.' They argue that probationers and inmates should have
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1. Michael G. Honeymar, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving
Probation: When Does it Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 437
(1997); Rachel F. Calabro, Correction through Coercion: Do State Mandated Alcohol and
Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
565, 602 (1998); Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God
by the State, 47 DuKE L.J. 785, 851 (1998). Apanovitch argues the following:
As a result of decades of rising crime rates and a revival of the
importance of self-responsibility in our society, criminals elicit little
sympathy from the populace. The imposition of a religion system on
some of the most vulnerable members of our society, however, should not
serve as an outlet for our pervasive sense of frustration with crime,
criminals, and the overburdened criminal justice system. Although
probation and confinement diminish some constitutional rights of
individuals, these circumstances do not trump the Establishment Clause,
which has an independent vitality that reaches into the darkest dungeons.
For inmates and probationers, the wall of separation between church and
state is not superseded by prison fences or the terms of probation. If
religious indoctrination is countenanced as acceptable in these contexts,
the reach of the Establishment Clause is reduced, replaced by the
'considered judgment' of prison authorities and the wide discretion of
sentencing judges. This result bodes ill for the principle of separation of
church and state.
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either statutory or administrative secular alternatives to A.A.
2
However, some jurisdictions may find that alternatives to A.A. would
be costly or geographically prohibited for probationers or inmates.
3
We argue that even if A.A. and other related programs could be
considered religious in nature, because of its effectiveness and the
primary goal of treating alcoholism and problem drinking or addiction,
A.A. would be comparable to faith-based programs that deal with
violence, teenage pregnancy and other social problems.4 Instead of the
bright line Lemon test,5 plaintiffs would have to show how their
religious growth, or non-religious growth, is dominated or subdued by
6attending A.A. We further argue that recent United States Supreme
Court cases allowing for more "play in the joints" permit this highly
contextualized approach. Moreover, by taking a contextual approach,
the government not only avoids a constitutional challenge, but also
adheres to one of the principles of A.A., of not compelling an
individual to participate in the A.A. process, while advancing the
important social policy of reducing drunk driving.
7
2. Calabro, supra note 1, at 602-06; Apanovitch, supra note 1; Honeymar, supra note
1, at 468-71.
3. See Honeymar, supra note 1, at 469. Under the California statute the county should
provide secular alternatives; however, if there are none, the statute outlines a process for the
"religious" self-help group:
The county shall not require the [self-help organization] to require
the participant to read, watch, or listen to material about or provided by a
self-help group if the participant informs the self-help organization that
he/she disagrees with sectarian principles advocated by the self-help
group. The county shall require the self-help organization to allow the
participant to complete an alternative activity from the list of approved
activities.
Id.
4. Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of Religion in Public Life and Official Pressure to
Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1093, 1161 (1997). According to
Salamanca:
Some present practices may violate Lemon, which prohibits official
actions that have the primary effect of promoting religion. Given the
religious nature of A.A., it can be argued persuasively that the 'primary
effect' of sending people to A.A. is the promotion of religion. Conversely,
if one accepts as persuasive the argument that the primary effect of official
referral to A.A. is a more sober citizenry, it becomes difficult to argue that
outright subsidies to parochial schools-and even churches-would
violate the Constitution, insofar as such institutions help mold a stable,
healthy citizenry.
Id.
5. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
6. See Salamanca, supra note 4, at 1162.
7. Id. Salamanca argues that the courts should use the following guidelines to avoid
constitutional conflict:
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II. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for an individual's right to exercise religious freedom.8 This
guaranteed individual freedom has been the source of much litigation
and will continue to evolve as our society changes. Driving under the
influence of alcohol is one of the major concerns of the criminal
justice system. 9 During the 1980s, the number of arrests for driving
under the influence of alcohol increased about twenty-two percent for
a total of 1,736,200 arrests in 1989.10 It is estimated that 22,000
highway fatalities in 1989 were related to alcohol.11 In 1989, out of
the 1,831,000 individuals on probation, 556,000 of these individuals
were on probation for drunk driving offenses. 12 The situation has not
improved significantly since the 1980s. According to Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, in 2003, after years of strengthened enforcement and
tougher laws, there were still 17,013 alcohol-related traffic fatalities.
13
Plainly, driving under the influence of alcohol remains an intransigent
problem. We argue that A.A. can, and ought to be, a part of the
solution.
Political and social pressures have created a "get tough"
approach to driving under the influence offenses. 14 These increased
arrests have caused some courts to use probation to "reform" offenders
in an effort to ensure that jail space is reserved for more serious
First, whenever A.A. is required, the government should try to make
a more secular program, such as Rational Recovery, an alternative, if
possible, assuming such programs demonstrate an ability to deal with
alcohol abuse effectively. Second, the government should never require
affirmation of the principles of A.A., nor should the government require
persons referred to A.A. to do more than attend, listen, and obtain
evidence of attendance. Finally, no person should be assigned to A.A. for
a long-term or permanent basis.
Id.
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; . U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. ROBYN L. COHEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: DRUNK DRIVING, 1989 SURVEY OF INMATES OF LOCAL JAILS 2 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Id. at3.
12. Id.
13. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, State-By-State Traffic Fatalities: 2003,
http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,8716,00.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
14. Patrick T. Kinkade & Matthew C. Leone, The Effects of "Tough" Drunk Driving
Laws on Policing. A Case Study, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 239 (1992).
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offenders. 15 Probation guidelines permit courts to order attendance at
A.A. or community rehabilitative programs.' 6 These court-sanctioned
organizations, while possibly violative of the First Amendment's Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, are necessary in order to protect
our society from the danger posed by individuals convicted of alcohol-
related offenses.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES AND THE FREE EXERCISE AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
The test for determining whether a violation of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause has occurred was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder.17  The test
balances a state's interest in accomplishing an objective against the
protection afforded under the Free Exercise Clause." That is,
"activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted
power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, of the
Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.' '1 9 As we
will demonstrate, A.A. is of proven effectiveness and, thus, clearly
related to the state's police powers of promoting safety. At least on
this surface analysis, it appears that our proposal respecting the use of
15. Brandon K. Applegate et. al., Public Support for Drunk-Driving Countermeasures:
Social Policy for Saving Lives, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1995).
16. In addition, the criminal justice system took many procedural steps in an attempt to
deal with the issue of drunk driving. These steps included electronic monitors (see Robert J.
Lilly, Electronic Monitoring of the Drunk Driver: A Seven Year Study of the Confinement
Alternative, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 462 (1993)), sobriety checkpoints (see Laurence H. Ross,
Sobriety Checkpoints, American Style, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 437 (1994) and Roy S. Ward,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, The United States Supreme Court Approves
Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 601 (1992)), ignition locks (see
Barbara J. Morse, Effects of Ignition Interlock Devices on DUI Recidivism: Findings from a
Longitudinal Study in Hamilton County, Ohio, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 131 (1992)), and bumper
stickers on the cars of DUI offenders advertising the fact they had been convicted (see
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). Other procedures included
mental health and police administrative modifications, including civil commitment of
offenders in mental institutions (see Rorie Sherman, DWI Arrest, Possible Committal, NAT'L
L.J., July 1, 1991, at 3), and possible civil liability for police officers who fail to arrest
intoxicated drivers (see Stephen D. Mastrofski, You Can Lead a Horse to Water ... A Case
Study of a Police Department's Response to Stricter Drunk Driving Laws, 9 JUST. Q. 465
(1992) and Victor E. Kappeler, Police Civil Liability for Failure to Arrest Intoxicated Drivers,
18 J. CRIM. JUST. 117 (1990)).
17. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18. Id. at214.
19. Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
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A.A. as a condition of probation would not run afoul of the Free
Exercise Clause. We will return to this later when we analyze the ill-
fated Religious Freedom Restoration Act and its successor, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in later sections
of this article.
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause presents a more
difficult problem. An early and now largely discredited test formulated
by Lemon v. Kurtzman20 would, if still followed, prevent the type of
analysis herein advanced. The Lemon court formulated the test for
determining whether a violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause has occurred as follows:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion. 2 1
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in an even
earlier case held:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws, which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religions. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa.
22
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. Id. at 612-13.
22. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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In 1992, the Court, without explicitly abandoning the Lemon
test, loosened the test a bit by holding in Lee v. Weisman that the
Establishment Clause is not violated unless there is psychological
coercion pushing a person "to support or participate in religion or its
,,23exercise. Since A.A. as a condition of probation is plainly coercive,
it is not surprising that other scholars have argued for allowing A.A. as
a treatment program, if and only if, there are secular alternatives.
24
If these cases, which have never been formally reversed,
remain good law, then our analysis plainly fails. We suggest,
however, that Lemon has been overruled sub silentio, and the Lee test
has been further relaxed allowing for far more malleability of the First
Amendment. Thus, as we argue more fully in later sections of this
article, more recent and hospitable case law permits the analysis
advanced herein. Specifically, we argue below that the recent
Supreme Court case Cutter v. Wilkinson25 evinces a far greater
sensitivity to state needs in the correctional setting and that even the
reintroduction of the "compelling governmental interest" and "least
restrictive means" tests, set forth by the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,26 will not bar A.A. as a tool in
the war against drunk driving. First, however, we review some of the
reasons why A.A. is so important to this battle.
IV. PROBATION
Probation is a procedure under which a defendant, found guilty
of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court, without
imprisonment, subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject
to supervision of the probation service. 27 Probation is considered a
privilege rather than a right, a contract between the state and the
offender, and a discretionary power of the court. 28 Conditions of the
probation must be reasonably related to the offense.29 The state of
23. 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
24. See supra note 2.
25. 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
26. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
27. Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When
Reasonable is not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45, 45 (1991) (quoting NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, STANDARD PROBATION AND PAROLE ACT §2(a) (rev.
1955)).
28. Id. at 55-60.
29. Id. at 63.
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California has a three-prong test to determine whether a condition of
probation is invalid by analyzing whether it:
(a) has no relationship to the crime of which offender
was convicted;
(b) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal;
(c) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality.
30
Probation allows courts to be creative, within established
guidelines, in an attempt to rehabilitate the offender. 31 Conditions of
probation may include opportunities to use services that can attempt to
"rehabilitate" the offending driver.32  In fact, the American Bar
Association has concluded that probation is a desirable disposition in
appropriate cases because:
33
The agency performing the intermediate
function should guide sentencing courts in the
appropriate use of compliance programs for individuals.
(i) Programs should promote offenders' future
compliance with the law.
(ii) Programs should not be unduly restrictive of
an offender's liberty or autonomy. Where fundamental
rights are concerned, special care should be taken to
avoid overbroad restraints that are so vague or
ambiguous as to fail to give real guidance.
(iii) Before an offender is sentenced to a program
of education, rehabilitation, or therapy, the court should
consider whether the offender will participate in and
benefit from the program, and
(iv) When an individual is required to pay a fine
as a condition of a compliance program, the court
should consider the offender's financial circumstances
in determining the total amount of the fine and the
30. Id. at 72 (citations omitted).
31. Jaimy M. Levine, Join the Sierra Club!: Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of
Probation, 142 U PA. L. REv. 1841 (1994) (Levine analyzes cases that imposed conditions of
probation that dealt with individuals' sex lives and other "private" activities. Some of the
cases were upheld and others overturned on appeal.).
32. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
SENTENCING 18-3.17 (1994).
33. Id. at 18-3.13.
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schedule of payment. When an individual is required to
make restitution to a victim as a condition of a
compliance program, the court should consider the
offender's financial circumstances in determining the
schedule of payment.
(d) The agency should ensure that sentencing courts set
conditions of a compliance program that fit the
circumstances of an individual offender. The basic
condition of every sentence to a compliance program is
that the offender leads a law-abiding life. Discretionary
conditions may deal appropriately with other matters to
the extent that restrictions have a reasonable
relationship to the individual's current offense and
criminal history, such as:
(i) cooperating with the required terms of
supervision;
(ii) meeting family responsibilities;
(iii) maintaining steady employment or engaging
in a specific employment or occupation;
(iv) pursuing a prescribed educational or
vocational training program;
(v) undergoing available medical, rehabilitative,
psychological or psychiatric treatment, including
periodic testing for illegal use of controlled substances;
(vi) maintaining residence in a prescribed area or
in an available facility for individuals sentenced to a
compliance program;
(vii) refraining from consorting with specified
groups of people, frequenting specified types of places,
or engaging in specified business, employment, or
professional activities;
(viii) making restitution of the proceeds of the
offense or making reparation for loss or injury caused
by the offense;
(ix) payment of a fine;
(x) refraining from the use of alcohol or illegal
substances or the possession of a dangerous weapon;
(xi) performing specified public or community
service.
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The agency performing the intermediate
function should develop a model set of compliance
program conditions and guidance concerning their use.
(e) The legislature should authorize sentencing courts to
set terms of a compliance program following release
from total or intermittent confinement. The post-
release program may, but need not, require supervision
of an offender.
34
Jail sentences have been said to have no deterrent effect on
drunk driving.35 Too often laws are created for their symbolic appeal
rather than for their actual effect. It is desirable to adopt policies
designed to deter crime (in this case drunk driving), but research
shows that these often have only a transient effect toward this intended
36goal. That is,
Court referred substance abuse treatment merits
serious consideration as a viable component in any
integrated policy on drunken driving. The results
support the contention that court-ordered treatment can
be effective with DWI offenders who meet clinical
criteria for alcohol or drug abuse or dependence as it is
with non-court-referred patients.
37
Courts throughout the nation have imposed conditions on
probation that require defendants to refrain from drinking alcohol if
the drinking was related to the offense and the focus is on the
defendant's rehabilitation. Requiring attendance at A.A. meetings,
as a condition of probation, places responsibility on the criminal.
Treating the criminal is important because:
[a]ddiction has roots other than those that cause
general criminal behavior. An addicted offender, then,
differs from a non-addicted offender. Therefore, some
34. Id.
35. Laurence H. Ross et al., Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The
Arizona Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1990).
36. Patrick T. Kinkade et al., Probation and the Drunk Driver: A Cost of Being MADD,
56 FED. PROBATION, June 1992, at 14.
37. Norman G. Hoffmann et al., Comparison of Court-Referred DWI Arrestees with
Other Outpatients in Substance Abuse Treatment, 48 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 591, 594 (1987).
38. United States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir. 1977).
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purpose may be served by treating the cause of the
deviancy rather than simply punishing the criminal
behavior. It is this assumption upon which alternative
sentencing to Twelve Step programs is founded.39
There exists a need to reevaluate A.A. as a condition of
probation, in order to rehabilitate the offender and to free society from
the dangers posed by alcohol-related driving incidents. "[W]hile
jailing D.U.I. offenders does little to prevent subsequent recommission
of the same crime, a sentence involving A.A.... can be successful."40
Furthermore,
A.A. is an attractive treatment tool for the
criminal justice system for three reasons. First, because
it is inexpensive to provide, is run by volunteers, and is
independent of the criminal justice system, A.A.
relieves the system of many financial expenses and
administrative burdens associated with treatment
programs....
Second, A.A. is widely accepted by
professionals as an effective way to combat the disease
of alcoholism. Finally, the program interacts neatly
with the goals of the criminal justice system:
punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
deterrence.4 1
The A.A. organization provides an environment for alcoholics to
succeed by providing a support system for alcoholics and an
opportunity for an alcoholic to "take responsibility for [his/her]
recovery." 4
2
39. Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You're Out (Of Prison): An Evaluation of
"Anonymous Programs" as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 137-38 (1996).
40. Id. at 158.
41. Id. at 148-49. "Even if the Establishment Clause requires that some
communications between A.A. members in some circumstances be protected by New York's
cleric-congregant privilege, [petitioner's] communications to fellow A.A. members do not
qualify for such protection." Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir. 2002).
42. Kinkade, supra note 36, at 142.
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
Since its inception in 1935, A.A. has been a major force in the
treatment of alcoholism, and has been credited with changing society's
view of alcoholism from a character flaw to a treatable illness.43 A.A.
is probably the most widely sought after intervention for those with
alcohol problems in the United States, and perhaps even the world.44
In fact, it has been stated that A.A. is sought out more frequently than
all other forms of professional alcohol treatment programs combined,45
and it is estimated that there are two million worldwide members of
A.A. 46 Of these members, almost 1.2 million are in the United States,
and they belong to one or more of the 52,000 plus groups/chapters in
the United States. 47 Using a twelve-step program, A.A. has the main
goal of helping people who have problems with alcohol by assisting
them through recovery. 48 It is widely believed to be an effective
intervention for alcoholism. 49
Yet belief is not fact. There is a need to rigorously research the
effectiveness of the twelve-step approach used by A.A. However,
43. Christine E. Le et al., Alcoholics Anonymous and the Counseling Profession:
Philosophies in Conflict, 73 J. COUNSELING DEV. 603, 603 (1995); ERNEST KURTZ, A.A.: THE
STORY (Harper & Row, 1988); Diane R. Davis & Golie G. Jansen, Making Meaning of
Alcoholics Anonymous for Social Workers: Myths, Metaphors, and Realities, 43 Soc. WORK
169, 175 (1988).
44. RESEARCH ON ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: OPPORTUNITIES AND ALTERNATIVES 1-5
(Barbara S. McCrady & William R. Miller eds., 1993).
45. John McKellar et al., Alcoholics Anonymous Involvement and Positive Alcohol-
related Outcomes: Cause, Consequence, or Just a Correlate? A Prospective 2-year Study of
2,319 Alcohol-dependent Men, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 302, 302 (2003).
46. Klaus Makela, International Comparisons of Alcoholics Anonymous, 17 ALCOHOL
HEALTH & RES. WORLD 228, 228 (1993).
47. Alcoholics Anonymous, Membership, http://www.aa.org/eninformationaa.cfm?
PagelD=2&SubPage=50 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
48. Michael Gossop et al., Is Attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous Meetings after
Inpatient Treatment Related to Improved Outcomes? A 6-Month Follow-up Study, 38
ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 421, 421 (2003).
49. William R. Miller & Barbara S. McCrady, The Importance of Research on
Alcoholics Anonymous, in RESEARCH ON ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: OPPORTUNITIES AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 44, at 3. There is abundant literature which touts the effectiveness
of A.A., but much of this literature is built upon single case studies or individual success
stories. See e.g., SUSAN CHEEVER, MY NAME IS BILL: BILL WILSON - HIS LIFE AND THE
CREATION OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS (2004). One of the problems with conducting
rigorous empirical research on the effectiveness of A.A. as an intervention is that A.A. does
not seek or promote research on the services and treatment it offers. Alcoholics Anonymous,
A.A. at a Glance, http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/en information_aa.cfm?PageID=l0
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005) ("A.A. does not: [k]eep membership records or case histories...
engage in or support research.").
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there are few well-designed, controlled research studies on its
effectiveness. 50 The limited research to date suggests that A.A. is
successful in leading to sobriety, at least for those who attend regularly
and finish the program.51 In fact, A.A. claims a seventy-five percent
success rate in terms of sobriety for alcohol drinkers who seriously
undertook and completed its twelve-step program. 52  Among
alcoholics, A.A. is frequently mentioned as a recommended treatment
intervention. 53 C.D. Emrick conducted a meta-analysis of the research
evaluating A.A., and found that between forty to fifty percent of
50. See generally Gossop, supra note 48; Richard J. Kownacki & William R. Shadish,
Does Alcoholics Anonymous Work? The Results From a Meta-Analysis of Controlled
Experiments, 34 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 2897 (1999); Le, supra note 43.
51. In a study involving 150 British individuals with alcohol dependence who were in
an inpatient unit, it was found that those who frequently attended Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings reported drinking alcohol on a less frequent basis than those individuals who did not
participate in Alcoholics Anonymous. This was particularly true of those who attended
Alcoholics Anonymous on a weekly or more frequent basis after discharge from the inpatient
care unit. Those who attended weekly or more after discharge reported greater reductions in
alcohol usage. See Gossop, supra note 48, at 424. The authors of the study concluded that
"[tihe findings suggest that A.A. can provide a useful aftercare resource and that regular
contact with A.A. may help to maintain the benefits accrued from alcohol treatment
programmes." Id. at 425.
In a study of 172 men and women, it was found that those who regularly attended
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings were more successful than those who did not attend or
attended less frequently. It was concluded that Alcoholics Anonymous could be a program to
help alcoholics achieve sobriety. Phillip Hudson, THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
MEMBERSHIP, SPIRITUAL AWARENESS, AND COMMITMENT EFFORT ON ALCOHOL-PROBLEM
ADVERSITY (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (on file with author).
In a study of ninety men and their female partners, it was found that those who frequently
attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings had higher rates of abstinence. See Barbara S.
McCrady et al., Alcoholics Anonymous and Relapse Prevention as Maintenance Strategies
after Conjoint Behavioral Alcohol Treatment for Men: 18-month Outcomes, 72 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 870 (2004).
It was found that Alcoholics Anonymous members generally report greater abstinence
than nonmembers. See Gerald M. Cross et al., Alcoholism Treatment: A Ten-year Follow-up
Study, 14 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 169, 172 (1990).
It was found that those individuals who attended Alcoholics Anonymous had better
alcohol outcomes than those individuals who sought no help. Additionally, it was found that
the more Alcoholics Anonymous meetings a person attended, the more likely s/he was to
maintain sobriety and s/he was less likely to have drinking problems a year later. Christine
Timko et al., Outcome of Treatment for Alcohol Abuse and Involvement in AA among
Previously Untreated Problems Drinkers, 21 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 145 (1994).
In a decade long study of 286 undergraduate Harvard graduates and 456 Boston youths, it
was found that Alcoholics Anonymous was one of the best predictors of sustained alcohol
abstinence. George E. Vaillant, A 60-year Follow-up of Alcoholic Men, 98 ADDICTION 1043,
1048 (2003).
52. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: THE STORY OF How MANY
THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM (1976).
53. Alisdair Mackenzie & Richard P. Allen, Alcoholics' Evaluations of Alcoholism
Treatment, 21 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q, 1, 8 (2003).
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members maintain abstinence long term and over two-thirds of
members improved but did not totally abstain. 54 He concluded that
A.A. "has been demonstrated to be associated with abstinence for
many alcohol-dependent individuals and thus the professional who
comes into contact with alcoholics should become familiar with A.A.
and utilize this self-help resource whenever appropriate. ' 55 This meta-
analysis of 107 published studies concluded that greater involvement
in A.A. resulted in reduced alcoholic drinking.56 In a long-term study
of alcoholics who had undergone formal alcoholic treatment programs,
the only predictor of sobriety during the ten years after discharge was
frequent attendance of A.A. meetings and functions. 57 In addition,
research has found that those who complete another substance
treatment program and then attend A.A. meetings are less likely to
resume drinking alcohol as compared to those who did not attend the
A.A. meetings after completing another substance abuse treatment
program.5 8 Thus, there is an indication that the effectiveness of A.A.
is increased when it is tied to participation in other treatment
interventions. There is also an indication that the effectiveness of A.A.
is not only tied to other treatment programs but also may be
independent of the other programs and may even enhance the effects
of these other treatment programs. 59 Moreover, participating in A.A.
has been tied to positive outcomes regardless of motivation or
psychopathology, suggesting that it is an effective treatment
intervention for those suffering from alcohol drinking disorders.60
54. Chad D. Emrick, Alcoholics Anonymous: Affiliation Processes and Effectiveness as
Treatment, 11 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 416, 419 (1987).
55. Id. at 421.
56. Chad D. Emrick et al., Alcoholics Anonymous: What is Currently Known, in
RESEARCH ON ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: OPPORTUNITIES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 44, at
41-76.
57. Cross, supra note 51,at 172.
58. See generally George Christo & Christine Franey, Drug Users' Spiritual Beliefs,
Locus of Control and the Disease Concepts in Relation to NA Attendance and Six-month
Outcomes, 38 ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 51 (1995); Robert Fiorentine, After Drug Treatment:
Are 12-step Programs Effective in Maintaining Abstinence, 25 Am. J. ALCOHOL ABUSE 93
(1999); George S. Alford et al., Alcoholics Anonymous - Narcotics Anonymous Model In-
Patient Treatment of Chemically Dependent Adolescents: A 2-year Outcome Study, 52 J STUD.
ON ALCOHOL 118 (1991).
59. Fiorentine found that weekly attendance of Alcoholics Anonymous was associated
with abstinence of alcohol even after controlling for continued treatment in an outpatient
treatment program. See Fiorentine,, supra note 58, at 112. Moreover, those individuals who
partook in both treatments did the best. Id. at I11.
60. In a study of 2,319 male veterans who sought alcohol treatment at VA hospitals, it
was found that participating in Alcoholics Anonymous during year one of the study was
associated with lower levels of alcohol-related problems during year two of the study.
Conversely, it was found that alcohol problems did not lead necessarily to participating in
363
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While A.A. may be successful, the key to success is
completion of the program. Many people who start the twelve-step
program by A.A. do not finish it. It has been claimed that almost half
of those who start the program drop out after several months. 61
Research strongly suggests that more frequent attendance of A.A.
meetings is linked to decreased chances of relapse (i.e., drinking of
alcoholic beverages). 62 In order for the treatment to be effective, it is
necessary for the person to continue attending A.A. meetings and
treatment events and admit that they are a member of A.A. 63 A.A.
involves a long-term commitment. Its effects, when discontinued,
appear to be short-term. Research suggests that the effects of
treatment provided by A.A. begin to wane somewhere between six to
eighteen months.64  Thus, it is necessary for most alcoholics to
continue to attend A.A. meetings for the rest of their lives. 65 This fact
Alcoholics Anonymous. Specifically, it was found that the level of alcohol-related problems
in year one of the study was not related to participation in Alcoholics Anonymous in year two.
More importantly, it was found that the level of motivation to change or level
psychopathology was not attributed to the changes in the participants in the study. See
McKellar, supra note 45. The authors concluded that "the findings are consistent with the
hypothesis that A.A. involvement causes subsequent decreases in alcohol consumption and
related problems." Id. at 306.
61. John N. Chappel, Long-term Recovery from Alcoholism, 16 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 177, 179 (1993); Elisha R. Galaif & Steve Sussman, For Whom Does Alcoholics
Anonymous Work?, 30 INT'LJ. ADDICTIONS 161, 164 (1995).
62. Paul E. Caldwell and Henry S. G. Cutter, Alcoholics Anonymous Affiliation During
Early Recovery, 15 J. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 221 (1998); R. Fiorentine & Maureen
P. Hillhouse, Exploring the Addictive Effects of Drug Misuse Treatment and Twelve-Step
Involvement: Does Twelve-Step Ideology Matter?, 35 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 367, 369
(2000); Norman G. Hoffman, Patricia Ann Harrison, & Carol A. Belille, Alcoholics
Anonymous after Treatment: Attendance and Abstinence, 18 INT' L J. ADDICTIONS 311, 314-15
(1983).
63. In a study of 1,506 alcoholics, it was found that the number of steps completed in
the twelve-step Alcoholics Anonymous program, the frequency of attending Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, and identifying one's self as an Alcoholics Anonymous member were
highly predictive in drinking outcomes one year after treatment. The more steps completed,
the more meetings attended, and the more willingness to admit membership, the greater the
number of days the person would remain abstinent during the year after treatment. Richard N.
Cloud, Craig H. Ziegler, & Richard D. Blondell, What is Alcoholics Anonymous Affiliation?,
39 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1117, 1128 (2004).
64. George S. Alford, Alcoholics Anonymous: An Empirical Outcome Study, 5
ADDICTIVE BEHAV., 359, 365 (1980). For example, Fiorentine found individuals who
continued Alcoholics Anonymous after discharge were more likely to maintain sobriety at
twenty-four months than those individuals who discontinued Alcoholics Anonymous
attendance after discharge. Fiorentine, supra note 58, at 107-08.
65. It was found that those alcoholics who frequently attended Alcoholics Anonymous
over a period of eight years had much better success rates during the eight years. Christine
Timko et al., Long-term Outcomes of Alcohol Use Disorders: Comparing Untreated
Individuals with Those in Alcoholics Anonymous and Formal Treatment, 61 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 529 (2000).
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supports the position of A.A. that alcoholism is a disease that can be
stopped but never cured. 66 Likewise, "one day at a time" is the motto
of A.A. In fact, there is evidence which suggests that the duration
spent with in A.A. is more important than frequency. 67 Furthermore, it
should be pointed out that relapses in other alcohol treatment
interventions also fail often and have limited lasting effects. 68 Thus,
the short-term effectiveness and the fact many participants relapse is
not unique to A.A.
There is also some evidence to suggest that those individuals
who embrace the spiritual part of A.A. are more successful.69 In
addition, some studies have not found positive outcomes resulting
from attendance at A.A. meetings. 70 While the success of A.A. is
subject to debate, A.A. is more frequently found successful as a
measure to combat alcoholism. One significant problem with A.A. is
that it is based upon voluntary participation and motivation to change.
While the research to date generally supports that greater attendance,
duration, and acceptance of the principles of A.A. are linked to
abstinence, it is unclear how effective A.A. is with people who are
forced to attend as part of a criminal sentence. There is very little
research on this population of individuals who attend A.A. functions.
However, it should be noted that about eighty percent of A.A.
participants were directed to A.A. through other programs, especially
counseling and other treatment programs. 71  These individuals
66. Le, supra note 43.
67. In a study which followed 473 people with alcohol use disorders for eight years, it
was found that those who remained with Alcoholics Anonymous did far better than those who
did not, regardless of the frequency of attendance in Alcoholics Anonymous at the start of the
study. Moreover, those who joined and participated in Alcoholics Anonymous quickly did far
better than those who delayed affiliation with Alcoholics Anonymous. Rudolf H. Moos &
Bernice S. Moos, Long-term Influence of Duration and Frequency of Participation in
Alcoholics Anonymous on Individuals with Alcohol Use Disorders, 72 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 81, 84 (2004) [hereinafter Moos, Long-term Influence].
68. McCrady, supra note 51, at 876.
69. In a study of 172 men and women, it was found that those individuals who reported
to have gained higher spirituality from attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings had fewer
negative consequences. See Gossop, supra note 48. The finding that spirituality is linked to
sobriety fits into the foundation of Alcoholics Anonymous which was originally based upon
Christian principles of giving into God, listening to God for direction, and removing sin from
one's life, among others. Le, supra note 43; KURTZ, supra note 43.
70. Brian H. McLatchie & Kenneth G. E. Lomp, Alcoholics Anonymous Affiliation and
Treatment Outcome Among a Clinical Sample of Problem Drinkers, 14 AM. J. DRUG &
ALCOHOL ABUSE 309 (1988). Stanton Peele, Alcoholism, Politics, and Bureaucracy: The
Consensus Against Controlled-Drinking Therapy in America, 17 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 49, 53-54
(1992).
71. Le, supra note 43, at 607.
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generally benefited from being directed to A.A. Overall the treatment
provided by A.A. appears to be effective.
VI. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES AND ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS
A.A., a community rehabilitative program, is a
fellowship of men and women who share their
experience, strength, and hope with each other that they
may solve their common problem and help others to
recover from alcoholism. The only requirement for
membership is a desire to stop drinking .... A.A. is
not allied with any sect, denomination, politics,
organization or institution .... Our primary purpose is
to stay sober and help other alcoholics to achieve
sobriety.
The heart of the A.A.'s suggested program of
personal recovery is contained in "Twelve Steps"
describing the experience of the earliest members of the
Society.72 Newcomers are not asked to accept or follow
72. These twelve steps are:
(1) We admitted we were powerless over alcohol - that our lives
had become unmanageable.
(2) Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could
restore us to sanity.
(3) Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of
God as we understood Him.
(4) Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
(5) Admitted to God, to ourselves and to another human being the
exact nature of our wrongs.
(6) Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of
character.
(7) Humbly ask Him to remove our shortcomings.
(8) Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to
make amends to them all.
(9) Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except
when to do so would injure them or others.
(10) Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it.
(11) Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious
contact with God, as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of
His will for us and the power to carry that out.
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these Twelve Steps in their entirety if they feel
unwilling or unable to do so. In addition, according to
A.A., the "higher power" which the participant is
encouraged to acknowledge need not be God.73
Applying this test to a mandatory attendance at A.A. meetings,
one court concluded that such condition was not violative of the
Establishment Clause by stating that:
[i]t is undisputed that the primary purpose of
requiring attendance at self-help meetings such as A.A.
is to prevent drunk driving and the tragic injuries and
deaths that result from it, while at the same time
providing treatment for individuals with substance
abuse problems. The "principle and primary effect" of
encouraging participation in A.A. is not to advance
religious belief but to treat substance abuse.74
This result has not been followed in subsequent cases. Indeed,
in Warner v. Orange County,75 the plaintiff, after pleading guilty to an
alcohol-related driving offense, was sentenced to three years
probation. 76  The plaintiff sued "alleging that the endorsement and
promotion of A.A. by the State through its approval of County alcohol
programs violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment., 77 The court stated:
[t]here can be no doubt ...that [probationer]
was coerced into participating in these religious
exercises by virtue of his probation sentence...
[Probationer] ... was required to participate in a long-
term program of group therapy that repeatedly turned to
religion as the basis of motivation.
78
(12) Having had a personal awakening as the result of these steps, we
tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in
all our affairs.
O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 306, n. 3 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
73. Id. at 306.
74. Id. at 307.
75. Warner v. Orange County, 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 1069-70.
77. O'Connor, 855 F. Supp. at 305.
78. Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075-76.
367
368 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
Given Lee v. Weisman's psychological coercion test, it is not
surprising that many lower courts and legal scholars have found
compulsory referral to A.A., without a realistic secular alternative, as
being violative of the Establishment Clause. While there is a non-
frivolous argument that A.A. is non-religious, its explicit reference to a
higher power combined with the coercive effect of court-ordered
probation make these lines of cases unsurprising.
The argument that A.A. is non-religious can be gleaned from
the Warner court's opinion which stated:
[s]upporters of A.A. refer to it not as a religious
organization, but as a spiritual group for recovering
alcoholics who have accepted that they are powerless to
control their drinking. Although God is mentioned in
six of the 12 steps to recovery, the program is not based
on a specific religion. Whether a person is Catholic,
Jewish, Buddhist, or agnostic should not engender a
religious conflict, since the program allows for
individual interpretation of "higher power.,
79
Indeed, A.A. and other self-help groups arguably fall outside
the domain of formal religion, but they offer strategies to individuals
80for attaining the ultimate meaning of life. On the other hand,
adherents also argue somewhat inconsistently that the concept of a
higher power is necessary from a psychotherapeutic point of view.
81
The point seems to be that A.A. is non-religious, and even if slightly
tending towards a vague sense of religiosity, it is unparalleled in its
efficacy and therefore necessary to fight the scourge of drunk driving.
Because of the powerlessness issue of addiction, and the relinquishing
of control over the addiction, an individual is empowered to deal with
alcoholism and life in general, through a higher power. 82
Involvement in A.A. significantly reduces the possibility of
relapse. 83  In Massachusetts, the recidivism rate for individuals on
79. Jane L. Uva, Alcoholics Anonymous: Medical Recovery Through a Higher Power,
266 JAMA 3065, 3065 (1991).
80. Paul H. Chalfant, Stepping to Redemption: Twelve Step Groups as Implicit Religion,
20 FREE INQUIRY CREATIVE SOC. 115 (1992).
81. Stephanie D. Brown, Alcoholics Anonymous: An Interpretation of its Spiritual
Foundation, 14 BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT. 25, 28 (1994).
82. Id. at 26.
83. Mary Sheeren, The Relationship Between Relapse and Involvement in Alcoholics
Anonymous, 49 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 104 (1988).
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probation with the conditions of alcohol treatment or education was
lower than the recidivism rate for DUI offenders on probation with no
conditions of treatment or education. 84 The primary focus of A.A. is
to help other alcoholics achieve sobriety, or at the very least, to make
individuals aware of the possibility that they may have serious
drinking problems.85  One study suggests that the success of A.A. is
based upon the recovering person's embracing of religion or a spiritual
awakening.
86
Thus far, our argument is that A.A. is critically important in the
fight against drunk driving and that the law, with regard to the
Establishment Clause, has been relaxing to the point that compulsory
use of these programs can be reconsidered. We turn to that argument.
A. Free Exercise: Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act87 (RFRA). This passage was in response to the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.88 In Smith,
the Court was asked
to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment permits the State ... to include religiously
inspired peyote use within the reach of its general
criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus
permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to
persons dismissed from their jobs because of such
religiously inspired use.89
84. See also Kalett, supra note 39, at 139; Mackenzie, supra note 53 (some studies
suggest alcohol treatment programs decrease recidivism). Other studies argue that A.A.
studies are ineffective, possess methodological flaws or provide assistance to recovering
individuals through processes other than a reliance on spirituality. See Marc Galanter,
Research on Spirituality and Alcoholics Anonymous, 23 ALCOHOLISM CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL RES. 716 (1999); Moos, Long-term Influence, supra note 67; J. Scott Tonigan,
W.R. Miller & Carol Schermer, Atheists, Agnostics and Alcoholics Anonymous, 63 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 534, 539 (2002).
85. See Lee Ann Kaskutas et al., The Role of Religion, Spirituality and Alcoholics
Anonymous in Sustained Sobriety, 21 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1 (2003).
86. Alyssa A. Forcehimes, De profundis: Spiritual Transformations in Alcoholics
Anonymous, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 503 (2004).
87. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2004) [hereinafter RFRA].
88. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
89. Id. at 874.
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In Smith, two employees had been fired from their jobs with a
private drug rehabilitation organization as a result of their ingestion of
peyote in conjunction with a sacramental ceremony of the Native
American Church, of which both were members. 9° Peyote is a
controlled substance proscribed by that state's law.91 As a result of
their discharges for misconduct, the two employees were denied
unemployment benefits. 92
The Smith Court began by citing Sherbert v. Verner,93 stating
that "the First Amendment obviously excludes all 'governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such.' ' 94 The Smith Court continued
by stating that
[w]e have never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate . . . . "Conscientious scruples have not,
in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs. 95
The only decisions in which we have held that
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law of religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press.
96
The Smith Court then detailed the balancing test for exemptible
activities resulting from religious purposes indicating that such a test
requires a showing that "governmental actions that substantially
burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
94. Id. at 402 (citations omitted).
95. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (citations omitted) (quoting Minersville School District
Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
96. Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
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governmental interest." 97 The Smith Court, however, indicated that the
Sherbert test does not apply to "require exemptions from a generally
applicable criminal law." 98 The Smith court concluded that "[t]he
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development.' 99  The Smith Court noted that a few states had
excepted peyote use from their criminal laws; 00 however, because the
state law in question did not include such an exception, because the
two employees' conduct was prohibited under that state's law, and
because such a prohibition was constitutional and consistent with the
Free Exercise Clause, the employees' denial of unemployment benefits
was appropriate. 10 1 Thus, "the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion."
' 10 2
It is plain that the Court's holding in Smith dramatically
relaxed the hold of the Establishment Clause. If the law had stayed
still at that point, one might have argued that with only a slight
expansion on Smith's holding that A.A.'s effectiveness and popularity
as a sentencing tool insulated it from serious constitutional attack.
However, the law as enunciated by Congress did not hold still for that
hypothesis.
As a result of the Court's holding in Smith, RFRA was enacted
"to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert and...
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened . . . ." The compelling interest test, in light
of Congress' clear intention, would arguably doom compulsory A.A.
Clearly, there are expensive and less effective alternatives and it is
anybody's guess as to whether the Court in that climate might have
held such alternatives to be necessary.
RFRA was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in
Boerne v. Flores.104  In Boerne, Archbishop Flores determined itnecessary to expand the church building in order to accommodate the
97. Id. at 882-83 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03).
98. Id. at 884.
99. Id. at 885 (citations omitted).
100. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2004) (congressional findings include the Smith holding).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2004).
104. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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church's growing parish. 10 5 The church applied for a building permit,
but the City of Boerne denied the application as violative of the city's
zoning ordinance.' 0 6 The church filed a lawsuit claiming, among other
causes of action, that the denial violated RFRA. 0 7 "The District Court
concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
10 8
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional.10 9 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.ll 0
The Boerne Court began by recognizing that RFRA was
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."' The Boerne Court then detailed the parameters of
Congress' power under this Amendment:
Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional
and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States.'. . . It is also true,
however, that 'as broad as the congressional
enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.'
Congress' power under section 5, however, extends
only to 'enforcing' the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court has described this power as
'remedial.'... [Congress] has been given the power 'to
enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation. 
2
105. Id. at 512.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Tex. 1995) ("[Tlhe
Court is of the opinion RFRA is in violation of the United States Constitution and Supreme
Court precedent by unconstitutionally changing the burden of proof as established under
[Smith].").
109. 521 U.S. at 512. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996)
(RFRA was constitutionally enacted under Congress' broad section 5 authority and could be
enforced without usurping the judiciary's power to interpret the Constitution.).
110. 519 U.S. 926.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 provides "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws .... The Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
112. Boerne, 521 U.S at 518-19 (citations omitted).
2005] DUI TREATMENT PROGRAMS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Boerne Court, after providing a thorough analysis of section 5,
indicated that the appropriateness of a remedial measure must be
viewed against the harm to be addressed. 13 The Court noted that the
legislative record lacked evidence supporting the necessity of RFRA
114
and that the reach and scope of RFRA was "sweeping."' 115  In
analyzing the language of RFRA, the Court noted that each party is
imposed with the highest burden.'1 6  That is, an objector must
demonstrate that "a substantial burden on his free exercise" exists and
the "[s]tate must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and
show that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its
interest."'117 The Boerne Court then concluded that:
[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to
'determine whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,'
and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.
Congress' discretion is not unlimited, however, and the
courts retain the power.., to determine if Congress has
exceeded its authority under the Constitution. Broad as
the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers
and the federal balance."
8
In so concluding, the Supreme Court held that it was beyond
Congress' power under section 5 of the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment to enact RFRA.119
B. Application of RFRA to Federal Government and Inmates
While Boerne found the enactment of RFRA beyond Congress'
power under section 5, lower courts have found RFRA applicable to
113. Id. at 530.
114. id.
115. Id. at532.
116. Id. at 533-34.
117. Boerne, 521 U.S at 533-34.
118. Id. at 536.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2004) (Congressional findings and declaration of
purposes); but see Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (holding that the RFRA was beyond Congress' power
to enact under section 5 of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment).
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the federal government. 120 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
matter.
2 1
In Kikumura v. Hurley, an inmate in a United States
penitentiary sued prison officials alleging violations of his rights under
the First and Fifth Amendments and under RFRA. 122 The Kikumura
court stated that "[i]t is clear from the analysis in [Boerne] that the
Court was focusing on Congress' remedial powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against states and local authorities."' 123 The
Kikumura court reasoned that "[b]ecause Congress' ability to make
laws applicable to the federal government in no way depends on its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
[Boerne] decision does not determine the constitutionality of RFRA as
applied to the federal government. ' 124  Further, the Kikumura court
reasoned, "Congress' power to apply RFRA to the federal government
comes not from its ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment but
rather from its Article I powers. ' 25 The Kikumura court concluded
that a plaintiff, under RFRA, must establish three elements: "(1) a
substantial burden imposed by the federal government on a (2) sincere
(3) exercise of religion.' 126 Once a plaintiff has established these
elements, "the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that
'application of the burden' to the claimant 'is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest' and 'is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest."'' 127  "Thus, under
RFRA, a court does not consider the prison regulation in its general
application, but rather considers whether there is a compelling
government reason, advanced in the least restrictive means, to apply
the prison regulation to the individual claimant.,' '
28
Application of RFRA to inmates is complicated further
because:
120. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
121. Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118.
122. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 953.
123. Id. at 958.
124. Id. See O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e
join other circuits and hold that RFRA may be applied to the national government.").
125. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959. See also Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001) ("Supreme Court
invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local courts."); Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998)
(Boerne is inapplicable where the RFRA is not being applied to states).
126. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 961-62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)).
128. Id. at 962.
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[p]risoners have long been understood to retain
some measure of the constitutional protection afforded
by the First Amendment's free exercise clause.
"Balanced against the constitutional protections
afforded prison inmates, including the right to free
exercise of religion [however,] are the interests of
prison officials charged with complex duties arising
from administration of the penal system." The free
exercise claims of plaintiff are "judged under a
'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental
constitutional rights."' 
29
One circuit has determined that "substantial burden" includes
consideration of:
(1) whether the "litigant's beliefs [are] sincere
and the practices at issue [are] of a religious nature."
(2) whether "the challenged rule... burden[s] a central
tenet or important practice of the litigant's religion,"
and (3) "whether the litigants' beliefs find any support
in the religion to which they subscribe or whether the
litigants are merely relying on a self-serving view of
religious practice."'
3 0
Thus, while RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to state and local
governments, it is, unless the Court rules otherwise, applicable to the
federal government. Its application in the prison environment is even
more complicated by policies governing the institution's policies. As
a result, the question regarding A.A., and other programs like it, is
whether the Court's current view of the Establishment Clause is such
that A.A. would be able to withstand even the more rigorous
"compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" tests. We argue
129. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). See also
Murphy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 501 (2004) (prisoners' constitutional rights may be limited in light of the penal system's
needs; "constitutional claims that would otherwise receive strict scrutiny analysis if raised by a
member of the general population are evaluated under a lesser standard of scrutiny in the
context of a prison setting.") (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987)). See Turner,
482 U.S. at 89-90 ("relational-relationship" test for analyzing the constitutionality of
regulations that burden prisoners' fundamental rights).
130. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
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below that it does with respect to states under the new Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,131 and that argument, if
valid, applies equally here as to the federal government.
C. State Initiatives
Several states adopted Religious Freedom Reformation laws.' 
32
One state passed a constitutional amendment, adopting RFRA
language.133  Two state statutes cite Boerne within the statutory
language. 134  A few states cite Smith and/or Wisconsin and Yoder
within the language. 135 All these states have adopted the compelling
governmental interest and least restrictive test as the standard for
determining whether a government has burdened the exercise of
religion.136  Standards to determine violations of free exercise of
religion include: "restrict,"' 37  "burden,"138  and "substantially
burden."139 Two states have adopted separate sections applying their
religious freedom statutes to correctional facilities, identifying the
necessity for the facility to establish a compelling state interest. 140
In applying these state statutes, the courts have given much
deference to prison officials in demonstrating a penological interest
that outweighs the burden placed upon the inmate. In one case, an
inmate claimed that his "Native American Religion" practices included
that he smoke tobacco cigarettes in order to permit the smoke to carry
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)(2) (2000).
132. ALA. CONST. amend. 622; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01, et seq. (2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01, et seq. (West 2004); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 73-402, et seq. (Michie 2004); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1, et seq. (2004); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-22-1, et seq. (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit.51, § 251, et seq. (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-80.1-1, et seq. (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10, et seq. (Law. Co-op. 2003); TEx. Civ.
PRAc. & REM. ANN. § 110.001, et seq. (Vernon 2004).
133. ALA. CONST. amend. 622.
134. ALA. CONST. amend. 622 § 11(6); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(5).
135. ALA. CONST. amend. 622 § 11(4); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(4), (6); S.C. CODE
ANN. 1-32-30(1).
136. ALA. CONST. amend. 622 § V(b)(1) - (2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01C.1-2;
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 57-571b(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03(1)(a)-(b); IDAHO Code ANN. § 73-
402(3)(a)-(b); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10 (b)(1); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3B; OKLA. STAT.
tit.51, § 253B(l)-(2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(b)(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40(1)-(2);
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. ANN. § 110.003(b)(1)-(2).
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(a).
138. ALA. CONST. amend. 622, § IV(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(a).
139. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01(B); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03(1); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 73-402(2); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10 § 15(i) & (ii); OKLA. STAT. tit.51, § 253A; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-32-40; TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. ANN. § 110.003(a).
140. OKLA. STAT. tit.51, § 254; S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500.
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his prayers; that state prison institution had a tobacco-free policy.
141
The court, in construing that state's Free Exercise of Religion Act,
determined that the state had demonstrated a compelling interest in
eliminating tobacco smoke in prison in order to promote "public
health, provide an environment free from second-hand smoke, reduce
litigation related to second-hand smoke, protect buildings against
property damage, and curtail rising medical costs.'
142
Another case held the prison institution had permissibly
confiscated an inmate's pamphlet as necessary to promote "order,
safety, and discipline."' 143 That court, finding little case law on that
state statute, turned "to federal cases for guidance, despite the fact that
the federal statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2000), was
held unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of its enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment by applying the law to the
states." 1
44
In yet another case, an inmate claimed a violation of his right
to practice his religion as a result of the prison institution's policy of
random cell assignment. 145  The court found that the institution's
policy of randomly assignin E cellmates did not inhibit or constrain the
inmate's religious conduct. These cases demonstrate that deference
is given to prison officials permitting the institution's policy to
demonstrate a compelling interest, despite its effect on the inmates.
These cases suggest that state courts will, for the most part, be
receptive to compulsory use of A.A. as a probation device. The key
question for most state courts will most likely be the position of the
United States Supreme Court. State courts, it appears, are not likely to
nix an effective treatment option, so long as it is not blatantly
unconstitutional as decided by our nation's highest court.
141. Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 839
(2003).
142. Id. at 339 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402).
143. Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill. App. 2002), appeal denied, 78 N.E.2d 156
(Ill. 2002) (citing 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/10(a)(6), (b)(l)).
144. Id. at 44 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. 507).
145. Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 100 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (Plaintiff, an inmate
who adhered to the Islamic Faith, claimed a violation of his right to practice his religion
because he was housed in a cell with a non-Muslim.).
146. Id. at 102.
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D. Post RFRA: Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
147
Three years after Boerne, Congress, in yet another attempt to
reassert the "compelling interest test' and the "least restrictive means"
test, passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). 148  This act amended RFRA, including re-defining
"exercise of religion" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."' 149 "The
RLUIPA is largely a reprisal of the provisions of the RFRA, but its
scope is limited to laws and regulations that govern (1) land use and
(2) institutions such as prisons that receive federal funds. " 150 Congress
passed RLUIPA, relying on its Spending and Commerce Clause
powers. 151  The RLUIPA clearly does not apply to the federal
government; rather, it protects religious exercise against government
burdens imposed by states and localities. 1
52
The statutory language [of RLUIPA] is nearly
identical [to RFRA] and statements by RLUIPA's
sponsors in the Congressional record indicate that the
legislative intent was to reenact RFRA in constitutional
form.... RLUIPA makes two fundamental changes to
RFRA. First, it pares the scope of the legislation from
RFRA's broad applicability down to only land uses and
claims by institutionalized persons. . . . Second, it
shifted the source of Congress' power to pass the Act.
While RFRA was styled as an expression of
congressional authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment RLUIPA was enacted pursuant
to Congress' power under the Spending Clause.
153
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000) [hereinafter RLUIPA].
148. Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
150. Adkins v. Kasper, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). See also
Murphy, 372 F.3d 979.
151. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the constitutionality
of RLUIPA has been questioned. See Adkins, 393 F.3d 559 (constitutionality is currently the
cause of a circuit split).
152. Yerushalayim v. United States Dep't. of Corrections, 374 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.
2004); Madison v. Riter, 355 F. 3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2003).
153. Dehart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 275 (3rd Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). See also
Madison, 355 F.3d at 315.
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RLUIPA, like RFRA, has also come under constitutional
attack. In Mayweathers v. Newland,154 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded "that Congress did not exceed its spending clause
power in enacting RLUIPA. '' 115  The Mayweathers court analyzed
RLUIPA under several constitutional provisions,1 56 including the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 57 Applying the Lemon
test,158 the court found that
[n]othing in RLUIPA indicates that wholly
impermissible purposes, such as the advancement of
religion, underlie RLUIPA. . . . RLUIPA intends a
secular legislative purpose: to protect the exercise of
religion in institutions from unwarranted and substantial
infringement... RLUIPA neither advances nor inhibits
religion. . . . RLUIPA merely accommodates and
protects the free exercise of religion, which the
Constitution allows.
"The statute itself defines religious exercise, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A), and requires only that states avoid substantially burdening
these practices without a compelling justification."' 159
Ten months later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the Mayweathers position in Charles v. Verhagen that
"Congress did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment by its enactment of RLUIPA." 160 However, eight days
after Charles, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held RLUIPA
unconstitutional in Cutter v. Wilkinson.162  Although the Supreme
Court has now reversed the Sixth Circuit, that court's position is useful
for an understanding of why, even given the more rigorous test
imposed by RLUIPA, an effective but somewhat religious treatment
program such as A.A. may yet survive constitutional scrutiny,
154. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 815
(2003).
155. Id. at 1070.
156. Id. at 1066-70 (RLUIPA analyzed under the Spending Clause, Establishment
Clause, Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment and principle of separation of powers).
157. See supra note 8 (Establishment Clause).
158. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
159. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068-69 (citations omitted).
160. 348 F.3d 601, 610, 611 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069).
161. See id.
162. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308
(2004). See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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notwithstanding the test employed. Our argument is that
notwithstanding the test employed, the Court's understanding of the
Establishment Clause has shifted to the point that A.A. can withstand
attack no matter what the semantic overlay is.
The Sixth Circuit in Cutter acknowledged Charles' and
Mayweathers,164  but determined that "RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause because it favors religious rights over other
fundamental rights without any showing that religious rights are at any
greater risk of deprivation."' 165 The Cutter court stated that the First
Amendment Establishment Clause requires neutrality. 166 The Cutter
court analyzed RLUJPA under the Lemon test 167 and concluded that
"RLUIPA is still unconstitutional because it has the primary effect of
advancing religion.' 168 The court reasoned that "[p]rior to RLUIPA,
restrictions imposed by prison officials upon inmates' fundamental
rights were subject to a rational-relationship review. ,,16' RLUIPA
"[i]n contrast to the highly deferential rational-relationship test . . .
requires courts to apply strict scrutiny to all substantial burdens upon
the free exercise of religion." 170 That is
[u]nder RLUIPA, prison regulations that
substantially burden religious belief, including those
that are generally applicable and facially neutral, are
judged under a strict scrutiny standard, requiring prison
officials, rather than the inmate, to bear the burden of
proof that the regulation furthers a compelling
penological interest and is the least restrictive means of
satisfying this interest. . . . RLUIPA . . . switch[es]
from a scheme of deference to one of presumptive
unconstitutionality. '71
Note the extent to which the argument has shifted. No longer
is the First Amendment deployed to stop a state from imposing some
form of religion. According to the Sixth Circuit, the state cannot even
163. 348 F.3d 601 (Wis. 2003).
164. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d 1062.
165. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
168. Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
171. Id. (citations omitted).
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favor a vague general religiosity. Thus, RLUIPA presents a bit of a
conundrum. On the one hand, it sets out a stringent test. If a state (or
the federal government) wishes to place some burden on religious
practice, it must show a compelling interest to do so, and must then do
so in the least restrictive manner. But the flip side of this is a robust
Establishment Clause that shoves all notion of religion outside of any
government program. Thus, it appears that, at least according to the
logic of the Sixth Circuit, RLUIPA is found unconstitutional by way of
a muscular Establishment Clause that would, if upheld, make
treatment programs like A.A. extremely problematic. We argue below
that the Court's reversal of this decision by the Sixth Circuit
paradoxically opens the door to treatment programs like A.A.
notwithstanding the reintroduction of the more rigorous "compelling
interest" and "least restrictive means" tests.
One month later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause in Madison v.
Riter.172 The Madison court cited Charles, 17 Mayweathers, 17 and
Cutter,7 5 acknowledging the two opposing holdings of those courts
regarding the constitutionality of the RLUIPA. Citing the now
discredited Lemon176 test, the Madison court analyzed the
constitutionality of the RLUIPA, acknowledging that the
RLUIPA may impose burdens on prison administrators
as they act to accommodate an inmate's right to free
exercise. But RLUIPA still affords prison
administrators with flexibility to regulate prisoners'
religious practices if the commonwealth "demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person - (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest."
1 77
The court concluded, stating that:
Legislative bodies have every right to accommodate
free exercise, so long as government does not privilege
172. 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003).
173. 348 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2003).
174. 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
175. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
176. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
177. Madison, 355 F.3d at 321 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)).
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any faith, belief, or religious viewpoint in particular.
Section 3 of RLUIPA fits comfortably within this broad
tradition. 
78
Finally, about one year after Madison, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held RLUIPA was validly enacted under the
Spending Clause in Benning v. Georgia,179 and that it did not violate
the Establishment Clause. Again, after applying the Lemon test,80 the
Benning court disagreed with "the Sixth Circuit, which held that the
heightened protection granted to religious exercise by RLUIPA
violates the basic requirement of neutrality embodied in the
Establishment Clause.''
E. Cutter v. Wilkinson: Change in the Court's Analysis of
Religion
The United States Supreme Court182 in Cutter reversed the
Sixth Circuit, upholding RLUIPA's constitutionality, while employing
an analysis that reinvigorates the space needed for state governments
to implement effective penal programs such as A.A.
First, and not insignificantly, as Justice Thomas stated in his
concurring opinion, "[t]he court properly declines to assess RLUIPA
under the discredited test of Lemon v. Kurtzman."'183 The Court has
been backing away from the Lemon test for many years and after
Cutter all that remains is for the Court to give it a decent burial. This
may seem a small thing, but it does show the extent to which the Court
is able to back away from unrealistically restrictive Establishment
Clause tests in order to give state and local governments breathing
space for successful and important penological programs. What the
Court and the concurrence must emphasize is the malleability of the
clauses that must provide space for programs that are effective and
needed but may, like A.A., arguably have some religious nexus.
Second, the Cutter case involved a very narrow question:
Could a state which accepted federal funding for its prisons, as all
states do, 184 prevent federal regulation that essentially mandated
178. Id. at 322.
179. Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
180. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
181. Benning, 391 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Cutter, 349 F.3d 257).
182. 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
183. Id. at 2125 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 2119 n.4.
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neutrality as among religions? In order to answer that question in the
negative, as did the Sixth Circuit, one must have a view of the
Establishment Clause that eschews any hint of religion. In other
words, in order to reject a position of neutrality among religions, one is
forced to take a position that is wholly secular in all respects and is
essentially hostile to religion. This stance would also require rejection
of all faith-based programs such as those that deal with teenage
pregnancy, violence and the like. By rejecting this position, the
Supreme Court left space for programs that have a vague religious
aura about them.
Third, the Court in Cutter emphasized repeatedly the
importance of giving "due deference to the experience and expertise of
prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and
procedure to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent
with consideration of costs and limited resources."' 85  Although
deference to prison and probation authorities has been a consistent
theme with the Court, it serves here as a warning not to read
RLUIPA's compelling interest and least restrictive means tests too
rigorously. The Court has, perhaps, given with one hand and taken
away with the other.
Finally, it is clear that Cutter will not tolerate "giving greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected
rights. 186
While the issue is not without doubt, it does appear that the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding RFRA and RLUIPA's attempts to
reinvigorate the compelling interest tests and the least restrictive
means tests, has fought Congress to a draw. The semantics of
compelling interest and least restrictive means have been reinstituted
and are not entirely toothless. But the climate has changed, and their
interpretation is at least an open question. We believe and have argued
that A.A. might not have met these tests in the era of Lemon or even
Lee v. Weisman. However, given the present climate, after all of the
back and forth between the Court and Congress, space has been made
for successful treatment programs, like A.A., to survive constitutional
scrutiny. A.A. works and is good policy, and the extent to which it
trenches on religious beliefs and practices is minimal.
185. Id. at 2123 (citations omitted).
186. Id. (citing Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Society needs assistance in lessening alcohol-related crimes.
Permitting probation officers to require attendance at A.A. meetings is
necessary to achieving this objective.
The plaintiffs argue that by recommending
[community rehabilitative programs] to some offenders,
parole officers steer the offenders to a religious
program and by doing so provide governmental support
to religion. The implications of the argument are
unacceptable. If recommending a religious institution
constituted an establishment of religion, a public school
guidance counselor could not recommend that a student
apply to a Catholic college even if the counselor
thought that the particular college would be the best
choice for the particular student. And, coming closer to
home, a parole officer could not recommend to a
parolee who had a serious drinking problem that he
enroll in Alcoholics Anonymous, even if the officer
believed that this was the only alcoholic-treatment
program that would keep the parolee from committing
further crimes. To suppose such recommendations
unlawful would be to adopt a doctrinaire interpretation
of the establishment clause remote from its underlying
purpose and historical understanding.18
7
Violations of the Free Exercise Clause require a balancing of
the state's and individual's interests. The state's interest in promoting
public safety, peace and order substantially outweighs a drunk driver's
threat to society that may be alleviated by mandatory attendance at
A.A. 18
8
A violation of the Establishment Clause "[requires] line-
drawing... determining at what point a dissenter's rights of religious
freedom are infringed by the state." 189  Finally, if EstablishmentClause logic were followed:
187. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397,414-16 (2d Cir. 2001).
188. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 240 n.1 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
189. Warner, 115 F.3d at 1076.
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any number of ubiquitous penal programs that are...
clearly permissible ... [would be endangered.] To take
just two common examples, prisons may have
chaplains, who systematically offer religious
counseling, services, and other programs to prisoners.
They may be selected, paid, and even monitored by
state officials. Also, sentences to community service
may involve service at soup kitchens, many of which
are operated by churches where a meal begins with a
prayer and religious tracts are distributed. 190
If the state's purpose is to eradicate alcoholism and its harmful effects
on society, the line should be drawn closer to society, requiring A.A.
attendance for assistance to the alcohol-related offenders.
190. Id. at 1080 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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